Lezione 12

Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Lezione 12 - Le crisi finanziarie pre-2007: Grande
Depressione; Messico 1994; Asia orientale
1997-98; Russia 1998; fallimento LTCM;
depressione giapponese; megafallimenti societari
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
1
Bari, EIMF 2012
0. Outline
Scaletta della lezione 12
1.  Grande Depressione;
2.  La crisi scandinava;
3.  Messico 1994;
4.  Asia orientale 1997-98;
5.  Russia 1998;
6.  Fallimento LTCM;
7.  Depressione giapponese;
8.  Megafallimenti societari.
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
2
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 1
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
3
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 2
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
4
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 3
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5
Economia Finanziaria
e Monetaria
Giovanni
Ferri
Bari,
EIMF 2012
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is a freely licensed media file repository. You
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Description Graph of the 1929 crash on Wall Street as part of a timeline from Oct 1928 - Oct 1930. See full graph
1. Grande Depressione – 4
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
1928
1929
1930
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
Giovanni Ferri
1936
1937
1938
1939
6
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 5
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
7
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 6
$12,000
GDP per American in constant year 2000 dollars
Depression
begins in the U.S
Banks closed
Gold convertibility suspended
World War II
begins in Europe
$10,000
$8,000
$6,000
Pearl
Harbor
attack
$4,000
Franklin Roosevelt
takes office
Herbert Hoover
takes office
Recession in
depression
U.S. rearmament
begins in earnest
$2,000
GDP per capita
Full normal GDP
$0
1928
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
1930
1932
1934
1936
Giovanni Ferri
1938
1940
1942
8
Bari, EIMF 2012
1. Grande Depressione – 7
$10 000
United States
Per capita income, 1996 international dollars (at PPP)
United Kingdom
Belgium
$8 000
France
Argentina
Germany
$6 000
Italy
Hungary
Japan
Brazil
$4 000
marks point
at which country
left Gold Standard
$2 000
1925
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
1930
1935
Giovanni Ferri
1940
9
Bari, EIMF 2012
2. La crisi scandinava – 1
58 Liberalization, Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
Ja
n
M –86
ay
O –86
ct
M –86
ar
Au –87
g
D –87
ec
M –87
ay
O –88
ct
M –88
ar
Au –89
g
D –89
ec
M –89
ay
O –90
c
M t–9
ar 0
Au –91
g
D –91
ec
M –91
ay
O –92
ct
M –92
ar
Ju –93
D l–9
ec 3
M –93
ay
O –94
c
M t–9
ar 4
Ju –95
D l–9
ec 5
–9
5
0
Sweden-DS Stock Market (100 at 1 Jan 1986)
Figure 8.1 Sweden stock market index
Source: Thomson Datastream
210
190
170 e Monetaria
Economia Finanziaria
150
Giovanni Ferri
10
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.1
Sweden stock market index
2. LaSource:
crisi scandinava
–2
Thomson Datastream
210
190
170
150
130
110
90
70
Q
1
1
Q 986
3
1
Q 986
1
1
Q 987
3
1
Q 987
1
1
Q 988
3
1
Q 988
1
1
Q 989
3
1
Q 989
1
1
Q 990
3
1
Q 990
1
1
Q 991
3
1
Q 991
1
1
Q 992
3
1
Q 992
1
1
Q 993
3
1
Q 993
1
1
Q 994
3
1
Q 994
1
1
Q 995
3
1
Q 995
1
19
96
50
Sweden real estate price index (100 at 1 Jan 1986)
Figure 8.2
Sweden real estate index
Source: Thomson Datastream
11
balance-sheet
channel (see sectionGiovanni
4.2.1 above).
However, the flood
of 2012
Economia
Finanziaria e Monetaria
Ferri
Bari, EIMF
money simply overwhelmed the capacity of financial institutions and
2. La crisi scandinava – 3
Recent Financial Crises 59
30
25
20
15
%
10
5
0
–5
–10
–15
Figure 8.3
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
–20
Banks’ claims on private sector (1Y percentage change – Sweden)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia
10Finanziaria e Monetaria
9
Giovanni Ferri
12
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.3 Banks’ claims on private sector (1Y percentage change – Sweden)
2. La
crisi scandinava – 4
Source: Thomson Datastream
10
9
8
7
%
6
5
4
3
2
1
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
88
19
87
19
86
19
85
0
Figure 8.4 Unemployment 1985–96 (percentage – Sweden)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia
Finanziaria ethe
Monetaria
Therefore
results
Giovanni
Ferrideregulation
years of
13
EIMF 2012
wereBari,
a specula-
of some
tive bubble, high private borrowing and an excessive credit growth (see
2. La crisi scandinava – 5
60
Liberalization, Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
2
1
%
0
–1
–2
–3
Figure 8.5
19
95
19
94
19
93
2
19
9
1
19
9
90
19
89
19
19
88
19
87
86
19
19
85
–4
Current account balance (percentage of GDP – Sweden)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia
Finanziaria
e Monetaria
domestic
demand
encouraged
Giovanni
Ferri
imports
and
the
a negative value (see Figure 8.5).
current
14
EIMF 2012
accountBari,
reached
Recent Financial Crises 61
2. La crisi scandinava – 6
14
12
10
%
8
6
4
2
Ja
n–
Ju 85
l–
Ja 85
n–
Ju 86
l
Ja –86
n–
Ju 87
l–
Ja 87
n–
Ju 88
l
Ja –88
n–
Ju 89
l
Ja –89
n–
Ju 90
l
Ja –90
n–
Ju 91
l–
Ja 91
n–
Ju 92
l–
Ja 92
n–
Ju 93
l–
Ja 93
n–
Ju 94
l–
Ja 94
n–
Ju 95
l–
95
0
Policy rate
Inflation rate
Figure 8.6 Policy rate and inflation (Sweden)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
15
Bari, EIMF 2012
shares of the Nordbanken and guarantee the loan issued by the Första
Liberalization,
2. 62
La crisi
scandinavaCrises
– 7 and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
9
8.5
8
7.5
7
6.5
6
5.5
O
ct
–
Ap 85
r–
O 86
ct
–
Ap 86
r–
O 87
ct
–
Ap 87
r–
O 88
ct
–
Ap 88
r–
O 89
ct
–
Ap 89
r–
O 90
ct
–
Ap 90
r–
O 91
ct
–
Ap 91
r–
O 92
ct
–
Ap 92
r–
O 93
ct
–
Ap 93
r–
O 94
ct
–
Ap 94
r–
O 95
ct
–9
5
5
Figure 8.7
Krona to US$ (Sweden)
Source: Thomson Datastream
increase
the interest
Economia
Finanziaria
e Monetariarate
16
to protect
the exchange
rate from speculative
Giovanni
Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
attacks. In the case of Sweden, the interaction between the real, bank
several sectors were deregulated and the NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement) agreement with the USA and Canada allowed Mexico
3. Messico 1994 – 1
180
160
140
%
120
100
80
60
40
20
Ja
n–
Se 86
p
M –86
ay
Ja –87
n
Se –88
p–
M 88
ay
Ja –89
n
Se –90
p
M –90
ay
Ja –91
n
Se –92
p–
M 92
ay
Ja –93
n
Se –94
p
M –94
ay
Ja –95
n–
Se 96
p
M –96
ay
Ja –97
n
Se –98
p
M –98
ay
Ja –99
n–
00
0
Figure 8.8
Consumer Price Index annual inflation rate (Mexico)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
17
Bari, EIMF 2012
Recent Financial Crises 65
3. Messico 1994 – 2
60
50
40
30
20
10
Total
98
1
19
97
Q
3
19
97
Q
1
19
96
Q
Q
3
19
96
19
95
1
Q
3
19
95
Domestic
Q
Q
1
19
94
19
94
3
Q
Q
1
19
93
19
93
Q
3
19
92
1
Q
3
19
92
Q
Q
1
19
91
19
91
3
Q
Q
1
19
90
19
3
Q
Q
1
19
90
0
External
Figure 8.9 Net public debt (percentage of GDP – Mexico)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia
Finanziaria
to enter
into eaMonetaria
large trading
on free trade policies.
Ferri
area, Giovanni
with excellent
growth
18
Bari, EIMF
2012
prospects
based
the bank supervisory bodies in such an institutionally weak context, to the
point that they could not prevent excessive exposure to risk by the bank3. Messico 1994 – 3
ing system. On their part, the depositors and investors felt reassured by
60
50
%
40
30
20
10
6
19
9
5
19
9
4
19
9
3
19
9
2
19
9
1
19
9
19
9
0
9
19
8
19
8
8
0
Figure 8.10 Bank credit to private enterprises (percentage of GDP – Mexico)
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
19
Bari, EIMF 2012
3. 68
Messico
1994 – 4 Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
Liberalization,
30
US $ B illion
25
20
15
10
5
Se 90
p–
Ja 90
n–
M 91
ay
–
Se 91
p–
Ja 91
n–
M 92
ay
–
Se 92
p–
Ja 92
n–
M 93
ay
–
Se 93
p–
Ja 93
n–
M 94
ay
–
Se 94
p–
Ja 94
n–
M 95
ay
–
Se 95
p–
9
Ja 5
n–
96
ay
–
M
Ja
n
–9
0
0
Figure 8.11 International reserves (US$ billion – Mexico)
Source: Thomson Datastream
9
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
8
Giovanni Ferri
20
Bari, EIMF 2012
Source: Thomson Datastream
3. Messico 1994 – 5
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
4
ay
–9
Ju 4
l–
9
Se 4
p–
N 94
ov
–
Ja 94
n–
M 95
ar
–
M 95
ay
–9
Ju 5
l–
9
Se 5
p–
N 95
ov
–
Ja 95
n–
M 96
ar
–
M 96
ay
–9
Ju 6
l–
9
Se 6
p–
N 96
ov
–9
Ja 6
n–
97
–9
M
ar
M
Ja
n
–9
4
2
Figure 8.12
Mexican pesos to US$
Source: Thomson Datastream
The heavy devaluation of the exchange rate pushed import prices up,
21
Economia
Finanziaria
e
Monetaria
Giovanni
Ferri
Bari,
EIMF
2012
which increased the inflation rate (see Figure 8.8). To curb the devaluation and to stifle inflation, the central bank significantly increased
3. Messico 1994 – 6
Recent Financial Crises 69
200
180
140
120
100
Ja
n–
M 93
ar
–
M 93
ay
–9
Ju 3
l–
9
Se 3
p–
N 93
ov
–
Ja 93
n–
M 94
ar
–
M 94
ay
–9
Ju 4
l–
9
Se 4
p–
N 94
ov
–
Ja 94
n–
M 95
ar
–
M 95
ay
–9
Ju 5
l–
9
Se 5
p–
N 95
ov
–9
Ja 5
n–
96
80
Figure 8.13
Stock market (1 at 1 January 1993 – Mexico)
Source: Thomson Datastream
other, the value of the assets in the local currency did not change. The
22
soundness of the household and Giovanni
company
sectors was also weakened
by
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
the increasing interest rates and the collapse this caused on the stock
70 Liberalization, Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 1
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
!5.0
South Korea
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
!10.0
Thailand
Figure 8.14 Current account (percentage of GDP – Asia)
Source: International Monetary Fund IFS
However, even if it followed the line of the Mexican crisis, the crisis 23
in
Giovanni Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
East Asia was a clear intensification in the pathology of systemic crises.
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Recent Financial Crises
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 2
71
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
Figure 8.15
South Korea
Philippines
Indonesia
Taiwan
USA
Germany
Malaysia
96
95
19
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
19
88
0.0
Thailand
Leverage for six East Asian countries, Germany and the USA
Source: Claessens et al. (1999)
80%
70% Finanziaria e Monetaria
Economia
60%
Giovanni Ferri
24
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.15
Leverage for six East Asian countries, Germany and the USA
Source: Claessens et al. (1999)
4. Asia
orientale 1997-98 – 3
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
Figure 8.16
the USA
South Korea
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
Taiwan
USA
Germany
Japan
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
19
89
19
19
88
20%
Thailand
Short-term debt share for six East Asian countries, Germany and
Source: Claessens et al. (1999)
the other two countries – was short-term debt in foreign currency (see25
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.17). The significant exposure
of these firms to exchange
risk –
due to their high debt in foreign currency, mainly with no coverage of
d
ai
la
n
Th
Ta
iw
an
s
M
Ph
ilip
pi
ne
ea
Ko
r
th
So
u
In
do
al
ay
si
a
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
ne
si
a
%
72 orientale
Liberalization,
Crises
4. Asia
1997-98
– 4and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
Foreign Short Term
Foreign Long Term
Domestic Short Term
Domestic Long Term
Figure 8.17 Distribution of debt in six East Asian countries (foreign vs domestic
and short vs long term)
Source: Claessens et al. (1999)
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
5.0
4.0
Giovanni Ferri
26
Bari, EIMF 2012
and short vs long term)
Source: Claessens et al. (1999)
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 5
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
!1.0
!2.0
!3.0
!4.0
!5.0
91
9
1
92
9
1
South Korea
Figure 8.18
93
9
1
94
9
1
Philippines
95
9
1
6
9
19
Indonesia
7
9
19
Malaysia
98
9
1
99
9
1
Thailand
Government deficit (percentage of GDP – Asia)
Source: International Monetary Fund IFS
Bank, 1996), due to high growth with high private savings rates, public
27
finance surpluses (or small deficits;
see Figure 8.18) and lowBari,
inflation
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
EIMF 2012
rates (see Figure 8.19), in contrast with the fragility that led to the crisis
Recent Financial Crises 73
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 6
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1
9
9
1
2
9
9
1
South Korea
3
9
9
1
4
9
9
1
Philippines
5
9
9
1
6
9
9
1
Indonesia
7
9
9
1
Malaysia
8
9
9
1
9
9
9
1
Thailand
Figure 8.19 Inflation rate (Asia)
Source: International Monetary Fund IFS
28
The concerns about Thailand had already started in 1995–96 upon
Giovanni Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
the appearance of signals of loss of external competitiveness – deficit of
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
74
Liberalization, Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 7
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
!5.0
!10.0
!15.0
!20.0
1
1
9
9
2
9
9
1
1
South Korea
Figure 8.20
3
9
9
4
9
19
Philippines
5
9
19
6
9
19
Indonesia
7
9
19
Malaysia
8
9
19
9
9
19
Thailand
GDP growth (Asia)
Source: International Monetary Fund IFS
Despite the intervention of international financial institutions, the
29
Economia
Finanziaria
e
Monetaria
Giovanni
Ferri
Bari,
EIMF
2012
crisis did not end in Thailand, but spread by contagion to several other
countries in the region, which were forced, one by one, to abandon
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 8
Table 8.1
Summary of bank behaviour in the countries affected by the crisis
Indonesia
South Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Negative real
rates until
summer 1998;
high real rates
thereafter
Yes (but moderate
from summer
1998)
High until
summer 1998;
moderately
high thereafter
Yes
Moderately high
in the earlier
part of 1998;
then declines
Moderately high in
the latter part of
1997; downward
trend in 1998
Moderately high
in 1997;
downward
trend in 1998
Yes
Yes
Yes (at least
temporary third
quarter 1997)
No significant
change in 1997
but sharpest
drop in 1998
From private
banks to state
banks
Sharp decline
in first half
of 1998
Sharp decline
in 1998
Downward trend
in 1997; drop
in 1998
From local
banks to
nationwide
banks
From private banks
and saving banks
to commercial
banks
4.2 Domestic to foreign
banks
Yes
Yes
From merchant
banks and
finance
companies to
commercial
banks
Yes
Slight upward
trend in 1997
and sharp
decline in 1998
From small banks
to large banks
NA
Yes
5 Evidence of flight to quality
by banks (e.g. via larger
holding of Treasury
securities)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
1 Degree of increase in real
interest rates following
the crisis
2 Increase in the spread
between lending rate and
interest rate on risk-free
assets
3 Extent of decline in the
growth of real loans
4 Evidence of flight to
quality by depositors
4.1 Among domestic banks
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
30
Bari, EIMF 2012
77
(continued)
78
4. Asia orientale 1997-98 – 9
Table 8.1
Continued
Indonesia
South Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
6 Evidence of disproportionate
contraction in loans to SMEs
Yes
Yes
Yes (loans drop
more in regions
where SMEs are
concentrated)
NA
7 Increase in the rejection rate
of loan applications
8 Shortening in the maturity
of financial intermediation
9 Evidence on contraction in
pre-committed loans
NA
NA
No obvious
decline but
drop in share
of small-size
loans
Yes
ND
NA
Yes, strongly so
Yes
Yes
NA
NA
Yes
Yes
No, contrary
evidence
NA
NA
Source: Domaç et al. (1999)
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
31
Bari, EIMF 2012
Liberalization, Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
5. 80
Russia
1998 – 1
300
250
%
200
150
100
50
Ja
n–
M 95
ar
M –95
ay
–
Ju 95
l–
Se 95
p
N –95
ov
Ja –95
n
M –96
ar
M –96
ay
–
Ju 96
l–
Se 96
p
N –96
ov
Ja –96
n
M –97
ar
M –97
ay
–
Ju 97
l–
Se 97
p
N –97
ov
Ja –97
n–
M 98
ar
M –98
ay
–
Ju 98
l–
98
0
Figure 8.21 GKO yield (Russia)
Source: RECEP, Russian economic trend, various issues
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
32
Bari, EIMF 2012
After the currency crisis in 1994, Russia started a delicate process of
5. Russia 1998 – 2
Recent Financial Crises 81
Others; 7%
CBR; 21%
Non-Resident; 30%
Banks; 42%
Figure 8.22 Distribution of GKO/OFZ holdings (June 1998 – Russia)
Source: Our estimates
250
200
%
150
100
50
Ja
n–
Ap 95
r–
Ju 95
l–
O 95
ct
–
Ja 95
n–
Ap 96
r–
Ju 96
l–
O 96
ct
–
Ja 96
n–
Ap 97
r–
Ju 97
l–
O 97
ct
–
Ja 97
n–
Ap 98
r–
Ju 98
l–
O 98
ct
–
Ja 98
n–
Ap 99
r–
Ju 99
l–
O 99
ct
–9
9
0
Figure 8.23 CPI annual inflation rate (Russia)
Source: Thomson Datastream
200 to 15 per cent during the period
1995–97
(see Figure 8.23); c) the
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni
Ferri
exchange rate fluctuated within a limited range between 5 and 6 roubles
per US dollar (see Figure 8.24); d) the high price of oil ($25 per barrel) had
33
Bari, EIMF 2012
82 Liberalization,
5. Russia
1998 – 3 Crises and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
25
20
15
10
5
Ja
n
–9
Ap 5
r–
9
Ju 5
l–
9
O 5
ct
–9
Ja 5
n–
96
Ap
r–
9
Ju 6
l–
9
O 6
ct
–9
Ja 6
n–
9
Ap 7
r–
9
Ju 7
l–
9
O 7
ct
–9
Ja 7
n–
9
Ap 8
r–
9
Ju 8
l–
98
O
ct
–9
Ja 8
n–
99
0
Figure 8.24 Roubles to US$
Source: Thomson Datastream
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
500
Giovanni Ferri
34
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.24
Roubles to US$
Source: Thomson
5. Russia
1998 – 4Datastream
500
400
300
200
100
Se
p–
D 95
ec
M –95
ar
Ju –96
n
Se –96
p–
D 96
ec
M –96
ar
Ju –97
n
Se –97
p–
D 97
ec
M –97
ar
Ju –98
n
Se –98
p–
D 98
ec
M –98
ar
Ju –99
n
Se –99
p–
D 99
ec
M –99
ar
Ju –00
n
Se –00
p–
D 00
ec
–0
0
0
Figure 8.25
Equity index (RTS ! 1 at September 1995 – Russia)
Source: Thomson Datastream
With these weaknesses, the two shocks affecting Russia in the second
35
Economia
Finanziaria
e
Monetaria
Giovanni
Ferri
Bari,
EIMF
2012
half of 1997 opened the way to crisis. On the one hand, the oil-price
drop reduced the value of Russian exports by approximately 20 per
Recent Financial Crises 83
5. Russia 1998 – 5
0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
!2
!4
%
!6
!8
!10
!12
!14
Figure 8.26 Federal budget deficit to GDP (Russia)
Source: RECEP, Russian economic trend, various issues
30
Economia
28 Finanziaria e Monetaria
26
Giovanni Ferri
36
Bari, EIMF 2012
Figure 8.26 Federal budget deficit to GDP (Russia)
Source: RECEP,
economic trend, various issues
5. Russia
1998 –Russian
6
Ja
n
M –9
ar 6
M –9
ay 6
Ju –96
l
Se –96
p
N –9
ov 6
Ja –9
n– 6
M 9
ar 7
M –9
ay 7
Ju –97
l
Se –97
p
N –9
ov 7
Ja –9
n– 7
M 9
ar 8
M –9
ay 8
Ju –98
l
Se –98
p
N –9
ov 8
Ja –9
n– 8
M 9
ar 9
M –9
ay 9
Ju –99
l
Se –99
p
N –9
ov 9
Ja –9
n– 9
00
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
Figure 8.27 International reserve (US$ billion – Russia)
Source: Thomson Datastream
approximately $6 billion foreign currency reserves within one month to
37
defend
the rouble
(see Figure 8.27).
Economia
Finanziaria
e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
This was added to deep political instability. In March 1998, President
6. Fallimento LTCM – 1
•  Gli algoritmi dei premi Nobel
•  Arbitraggi: tempi normali vs. speciali (fat tails)
•  Tra effetti domino e moral hazard
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
38
Bari, EIMF 2012
Recent Financial Crises 103
7. Depressione giapponese – 1
40.000
20.000
18.000
16.000
14.000
12.000
10.000
8.000
6.000
4.000
2.000
-
35.000
30.000
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
All land
Six largest cities
98
19
96
19
94
19
92
19
90
19
88
19
86
19
84
19
82
19
80
19
78
19
76
19
74
19
72
19
19
70
-
NIKKEI 225 (right scale)
Figure 8.34 Japan double bubble
Source: our elaboration
for access to the bond market by the firms and the creation of the
39
commercial
market.
Economia
Finanziaria epaper
Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
Bari, EIMF 2012
These developments had important consequences for the banking
106 Liberalization,
7. Depressione
giapponese Crises
– 2 and Mega-Corporate Bankruptcies
i
IS0
IS1
LM
i0 = i1
Y0
Y1
Y
Figure 8.35 Liquidity trap
where it is the short-term rate selected by the central bank on the basis 40
Economia of
Finanziaria
e Monetaria
Giovanni
Bari,
EIMF 2012
parameters,
which are all positive:
a1Ferri
(the weight given to the
inflation objective), a2 (the weight given to the objective of containing the
8. Megafallimenti societari – 1
•  I certificatori collusi
•  Le agenzie di rating
•  Le risposte: Sarbanes-Oxley ecc.
Economia Finanziaria e Monetaria
Giovanni Ferri
41
Bari, EIMF 2012